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By letter of 20 December 1979 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
requested authorization to draw up a report on the relations between the European 
Cotmunity and the East European state-trading countries and CCMEX::ON. 
On 20 December 1979 the Committee on External Economic Relations provisionally 
appointed Mr DE CLERCQ Rapporteur. 
On 23 February 1982, Mr IRMER was appointed Rapporteur in Mr DECLERCQ's 
place. 
By letter of 5 February 1980, the President of the European Parliament 
authorized the Ccmnittee to draw up a report on this matter. 
On 18 December 1980 a Motion for a Resolution (Doc. 1-750/80) tabled 
by Mr Christopher JACKSON in accordance with Rule 25 of the then Rules of 
Procedure, on detente and trade with Canecon countries, was referred to the 
Ccmnittee. 
The Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 1 October 
1980, 28 February 1981, 18 March 1981, 23 June 1981 and 27 May 1982, when 
the rrotion for a resolution and explanatory statement were adopted by 13 votes 
to 3 with 5 abstentions. 
The following Members took part in this first vote : 
Sir Fred Cathe~, chairman~ Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, vice-chairman~ 
Mr van Aerssen, vice-chairman~ Mr Seal, vice-chainnan; Mr Inner, rapporteur~ 
Mrs Baduel-Glorioso~ Mr Bonaccini (deputizing for Mr Galluzzi), 
Mrs Carettoni-Raoagnoli (deputizing for Mr Alavanos), Mr Del Duca (deputizing 
for Mr Filippi) , Mrs Lenz (deputizing for Mr Blutrenfeld) , Mr Maher (deputizing 
for Mr Damseaux), Mrs L. Moreau, Mrs T. Nielsen (deputizing for Mr GaWronski), 
Mr Paulhan, Mr Pelikan, Mrs Pruvot, Mr Radoux, Mr Rieger, Mr Stella, 
Sir Fred Warner and Mr Welsh. 
At its meeting of 23 June 1982 the Political Affairs Committee decided 
not to deliver an opinion on this report. 
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The Committee on External Economic Relations hereby submits 
to the European Parliament the following Motion for a Resolution together 
with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
-----------------------
nn rPl~tinns hPtwppn thP. European community and the East European 
~tatP-tr~rling r.nuntriPS t:~nd the CMEA (COMECON) 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to its resolution of 17 October 1980 on the follow-up 
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Madrid, 
in which Parliament outlined the major themes and basic principles of 
relations in the economic sphere between the community and its Member 
States and the East European states, 
B. gravely concerned at recent develcpnents in Poland, which could have 
damaging effects on relations between the European COmmunity and the 
COMECON countries, 
c. convinced of the need for the ccmnunity to begin consulting its other 
important trade partners with a view to reaching a new consensus on the 
form that economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union should take 
in future, 
D. expressing the hope that relations between the European community and the 
East European countries might be placed on a more realistic basis, 
particularly in the areas of economic affairs and trade, 
E. pointing out that, as errphasized in the Helsinki Final Act, the expansion 
of trade between East and West Europe must not result in disruption of 
the market, or be detrimental to domestic producers or manufacturers, 
F. recognizing that the Polish crisis has placed the creditworthiness of 
the COMECON countries in doubt, 
G. drawing attention once again to the powers conferred on the community 
in the field of commercial policy by Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, 
H. having regard to the Motion for a Resolution tabled by Mr Christopher J.ACKSON 
(Doc. 1-750/80), 
J. having regard to the conclusions of the report by Mr AIGNER (Doc. 1-846/81), 
K. having regard to the report of the Ccmnittee on External Economic Relations 
(Doc. 1-531/81), 
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1. Considers that East~st trade should be encouraged within the general 
framework established by the Helsinki Final Act, and that the develcprent 
of trade relations between the signatory states ought therefore to be 
accatpai:lied by the reroval of restraints on the exchange of persons and 
information; 
- Draws attention to the risks involved in the granting of unlimited cheap 
credit facilities, 
- regards East-West trade as possible· only in the context of close, direct 
and bilateral relations between the European Community as a whole on one 
side and the individual signatory states of the CMEA on the other; 
2. Regrets that most CMEA countries maintain no direct diplomatic relations 
with the EEX:, although 113 third countries already do so; 
3. Regards as unacceptable the fact that trade bet-ween the Cammunity and 
the individual CMEA countries is still not regulated by trade agreements 
despite the offer of negotiations by the Community in 1974; 
- Regards recognition of the Community by the CMEA countries as essential 
for the further develcpnent of trade between the European Community and 
the CMEA countries; 
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4. In this connection welcomes the conclusion in 1980 of the agreement 
with RQnania on an EEC-ROmania Joint Committee and trade in indust-
rial products, and also welcomes the first steps taken by Hungary 
to facilitate international trade with the CMEA countries; 
s. calls on other East European countries to -take similar steps to conclude 
agreements with the European Community; 
6. Warns against the use of the ambiguous nature of many of the 
bilateral cooperation agreements between Member States of the 
Community and individual CMEA countries as a means of circumventing 
the common commercial policy: 
7. Emphasises that in its view the Community is authorised to conclude 
cooperation agreements directly by virtue of its responsibility 
for formulating the common commercial policy, which covers in 
particular export policy (Article 113 of the EEC Treaty): 
8. Calls also on the Member States to take account of this in future 
and to t~ke steps to ensure that the Community is given the 
instruments necessary to implement such a policy: 
9. Also requests that the consultation procedure for cooperation agree-
ments decided on in 1974 should be amended to provide effective 
community supervision of these agreements while respecting the 
powers of the community and giving the Community a comprehensive 
basis for a cooperation policy; 
10. Stresses that one prerequisite for an active trade policy by the 
Community is a common credit policy and above all the setting up 
and progressive development of a Community reinsurance system for 
export credits, which are normally channelled to market conditions; 
and points out in this connection that its resolution of 17 October 
1980 called for a coordination of credit policies; 
11. calls on the Commission to ~;uhm.i. t ,Z>!:"OpOs«ls \v.i:'..::.·riJ.l six m::nt.l-s fer 
<l OJlTIOl G'TIV.~ Jxll.~cy to :.TI\K~ iln ;~ ! ¥.!£:iS fer fub..u:e t.ta'e reh."1ti£ns, 01 W\idl. Parl.iarBlt 
CX[)Cet.s tl1c Cotmcll to rc~..ch u swif":. c.cci.c:.on; 
!~~-~!!~!!i~~-!!_~~2!~~!-!~!~!~~!!~~!!_~~!!~!2e!-~E~~~~-!~_!!S_!~~·. 
the CMEA 
12. Notes that the talks instituted at the initiative of the c~ 
countries on an agreement with the Commu~tty have failed to produce 
any concrete results so far and that neg~tiations are still very 
laborious: 
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13. considers the conclusion of an agreement between the Community and 
the CMEA to b~ useful but. stresses that differences between the 
conditions in the various CMEA countries rule out the in~lusion 
of tr~de provisions in such an aqreement, a~d notes the community's 
proposal that a reference to the importance of trade between 
the CMEA and the Community be included in the preamble to the 
framework agreement; 
14. Is opposed to an agreement with the CMEA being allowed to govern 
bilateral agreements between the Community and the individual CMEA 
countries; 
15. supports the commission in the negotiations it has conducted so far 
in which it has consistently upheld the aims of the Community; 
I 
16. Requests the Ccmni ssion to report on further action taken on the resolutiOn. · 
17. 
of 17 October 1980, in which Parliament called for the necessary steps to 
nc ::.al:::cn to sol Vf) ' •• he ; )J':"ol)lcms as!:xx~.i a ted with cc:::-~· n:.n obs·::ncJ.es ·created 
by ~-~K~ i TI1iX1!~ ~ j· inn n[ linl'.c<.l trade ugreetOOilES ilflC~ C.U..mping by East European 
states on Community markets; 
compensation arrangements 
- Points to the increasing number of comp~nsation transactions in 
the last few years between firms in the:community and the CMEA 
countries; 
- Notea ~hat these practices sometimes have drastic effects on 
existing or potential EEC industries, threatening existing 
markets and new employment opportunities, 
-Notes that difficultics·arise from the non-convertibitity of 
East European currencies· and that difficulties of this kind 
recently forced Hungary to reconsider its pqlicies: 
- Calls on the Commission to stGp up its· efforts to fina ways of 
controlling compensation transactions and to submit proposals on 
means by which the adverse effects of compensation transactions 
on the community's economy can be redu~ed: 
Requests the Commission to draw up a de.tailed report for communi-
cation to the Council and the European .Parliament, on the operation 
of compensation arrangements, including an opinion as to whether 
the adaptation of competition rules is desirable: 
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I. Duxrping 
- Is disturbed by the increasing cases of dumping by the CMEA 
countries which mainly affect a number of economically sensitive 
sectors in the camruni ty as well as end products, and which are 
also increasingly impeding the transport and services sectors; 
- Considers that the Community must examine the possibility of liberalising 
irrport quotas in the context of a jointly agreed q>en trade policy 
involving reciprocal obligat.ions, and calls for the liberalisation 
of trade to be made conditional on the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements with CMEA countries containing effective protection 
clauses and laying down proper consultation procedures; 
- Again urges the Community authorities to act consistently and 
effectively in the transport sector to prevent durt"q?ing by the 
CMEA countries; 
- Wishes the Commission to publish its findings on the operation of 
the system introduced in 1978 for monitoring the activities of the 
merchant fleets of third countries and calls on the Commission to 
inform Parliament of its new plans in this respect in good time; 
- Urges that an effective price clause be made a regular feature of 
any future cooperation agreements; 
. German internal trade 
- Recalls that German internal trade is covered by a special protocol 
to the Treaty of Rome; 
- Requests thE Cummission to publish, on a regUlar basis, statistics 
under a special heading in Euro-Stat concerning intra-German trade; 
Trade in agricultural products 
- Asks the Commission to look into the possibility of expanding agri-
cultural exports from the Community to CMEA countries without granting 
special preferences and without disadvantage for the Common Agricultural 
Policy, in the context of a CcnnRU1ity credit policy; 
The trade embargo 
- Asks the Community authorities to give an exposition of the principles 
and effectiveness of the trade embargo as an instrument of Community 
trade policy, with particular regard to its possible application to the 
CMEA countries, and to compare the use of this instrument to that of 
credit restrictions; 
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- Emphasizes the particular problem involved in the export of advm1ced 
technology products to CMEA countries; 
- Instructs the appropriate parliamentary committee to draw up an own-
initiative report on the question of the CCXXl-1 arrangements, which 
should also take account of reactions to events in Poland; 
22. The burden of debts 
- Points to the growing indebtedness of the East European countries 
towards the industrialized countries and especially to the problem 
of the debt repayrrent ratios of sare of these countries; 
- Believes that, wilh a view to creating a Coornunity credit policy, 
the Community must keep a close 0yc on this indP.btedness and that 
concerted international efforts are necessary to solve the problem; 
- Considers that the indebtedness of the COMECON countries has reached 
a level which constitutes a serious threat to Western credit markets; 
- Considers that, in the absence of a clearly agreed Community credit 
policy, there is little prospect of an increase in the volume of 
trade or the number of trade agreenents between the European 
community and the CMEA countries; 
23. -Notes that by virtue of its large energy and raw material resources 
the Soviet Union has hecn able to strengthen its trade position 
within the c MH\ and vis-a-vis the Western countries; 
- Expects th0t thP. ~nergy crisis is likel.Y to have adverse reper-
cussions on gEC relations with the CMEA countries, since only by in-
creasing exports and simultaneously reducing irrports will the latter 
be able to achieve the foreign exchange surplus necessary to finance 
their energy requirements; 
- Calls for closer cooperation on energy between the Community and the 
individual CMEA countries in order to reduce unilateral dependence; 
- Points out that in its resolution of 17 Oct(j)er 1980 it reaffirmed 
a considerable interest in the development of cOJperation and in 
the ::;·tudy of suitable projects, particularly in the energy field, 
and ~J~Jelcunes t.hc preliminary work to this end in the ErE; 
24. Observes that slowdown in East-West trade because of the econanic and 
political situation and believes that the conclusion of the framework 
agreement between the community and the CMEA m1d of trade agreements 
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bettMen the Camuti.ty and individual OG'A camtries will ca1tribute 
to the reclx:tioo of Obetaclea in East-west trade and to its further 
0 
0 0 
25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Governments 
of the Meillter States and the Council and Ccmnission of the Ellrqlean 
ca..mities. 
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B 
EXPIANA TORY STA TEMEN'l' 
I. Introduct:i:on 
1. Problems eonneeted with relations between the lllC llnd coMJ!:CbN are 
important not only because relations with a large number of neighbouring 
countries are involved, but also because very little progress has been made 
so far in developing these relations, which have undergone considerable 
changes in recent years. 
various features of trade relations with the Eastern European countries 
differ radically from the EEC's traditional patterns of trade with other third 
countries. They have a different economic system, their external trade is 
determined by state machinery, and they are grouped together in an 
organization - COMECON - which does not have the same powers as the EEC: 
this means that East-West trade and organized relations between the two 
parties demonstrate some distinctive characteristics, with specific problems 
and practices, which sometimes give rise to polemic statements questioning 
the point of this trade. Although it is often claimed that East-West trade 
offers more concrete advantages for the Eastern European states than for the 
EEC, it should be stated from the outset that - as long as certain well-
defined principles are observed - the EEC has little or no cause to oppose 
further harmonious development of its trade relations with the Eastern European 
countries. This problem is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter v of this 
report. 
In this connection your rapporteur wishes to draw the attention of the 
Commission and the Council to the importance which the European Parliament 
attaches to being consulted whenever the Canmunity is conducting negotiations 
with third countries. As the Community is currently engaged in negotiations 
with COMECON, it is essential to emphasize Parliament's desire to have a say 
in the decision-making process and in the Commission's policy in these 
negotia tiona. 
2. It should be made clear from the start which countries belong to COMECON. 
They are the USSR, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Vietnam, 
Csechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Mongolian People's Republic 
and Cuba. Albania is a passive member, Yugoslavia takes part in certain 
areas of COMECON's work and Angola, Ethiopia, North Korea and Laos have 
observer status. When we talk in this report of relations with certain state-
trading countries, we are referring only to the Eastern bloc members of 
COMECON and not, for instance, to certain Asian COMECON countries. Trade 
with Mongolia, Vietnam and North Korea is not substantial and is therefore 
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of m1.nor 1.mportance 
3. There are many complex facets to East-West economic relations. As 
far as relations between the European Community and the above-mentioned 
Eastern bloc countries are concerned, your rapporteur will concentrate 
primarily on three aspects: first, agreements with individual state-
trading countries: second, the possible conclusion of an agreement with 
COMECON as a whole and, third, the problem of certain practices of East 
European firms and states and their repercussions on trade relations. 
Each of these aspects will be dealt with in turn, with a description 
of the present situation and a look at possible future developments. 
II. The state of relations and agreements between the EEC and the Eastern 
European state-trading countries 
4. Since 1969, the end of the transitional period, the EEC alone has 
been empowered to pursue an··autonomous trade policy. The period was extended 
in the case of its relations with state-trading countries, but since 1975 
it has been forbidden for Community Member States to conclude individual 
2 
trade agreements with these countries • 
When the earlier, individual agreements expired in 1974, the Community 
made it clear to the COMECON countries that it was prepared to negotiate 
trade agreements to replace the old onea.While waiting for the COMECON 
parties to take up this offer of negotiations, and in order to fill the 
vacuum thus created, the Community took the following measures: 
3 
an autonomous import system was created , a general outline agreement 
(together with a proposal on textiles) was drawn up and a joint consultation 
procedure for the cooperation agree~nts between individual EEC Member 
States and member states of COMECON was set u~ 
5. Cooperation agreements, which provide for technical, scientific, 
economic or industrial cooperation,a·re still a thorny problem. In some 
cases, these agreements are in the form of declarations of intent in 
1 China (not a member of COMECON), on the other hand, has been the first 
state-trading country after Yugoslavia but before Romania to conclude a 
trade agreement with the Community (on the pattern of EEC agreements) on 
which the Committee on External Economic Relations has already published 
a report 
2 From 1 January 1973 all Member 3tates of the Community were forbidden 
to negotiate or sign a bilateral trade agreement with an Eastern bloc 
country: most bilateral trade agree•nts expired on 31 December 1974. 
3 
This autonomous import scheme is simply a Community list of import 
quotas. By 30 November each year the Council of the European Communities 
must decide on the changes to be made to the scheme for the following 
year. 
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which the parties concerned list the sectore in which they wish to 
promote cooperation. 
These texts usually contain a description of the administrative methods 
to be used to implement the cooperation envisaged. Proposals for specific 
cooperation proj~ts are set out in annexes to th$ agreement or contained in 
separate protocols. Larger countries, whose objectives in cooperating with 
Eastern Europe are not purely economic, sometimes inc~porate specific 
cooperation projects in their cooperation agreements to.help boost the prestige 
of certain sectors of their national economy. 
In addition, these agreements create a framework within which undertakings 
and industrialists and businessmen are able to increase direct contacts 
and seek various practical forms of cooperation. One major problem is 
that, owing to the oftenambiguous nature of these agreements - the 
distinction between a trade agreement and a cooperation agreement is 
difficult to draw - the Member States of the European Community circum-
vent Community powers and even fail to comply with the consultation 
1 procedure • 
6. It is the task of the European Parliament to urge the Commission to pursue 
a consistent policy and - as is the case with other third countries -
itself institute Community cooperation agreements or change the consul-
talon procedure set up by the decision of 22 July 1974 so .·as to make it 
a suitable means of obtaining all the necessary information fr the 
impleme~tation of a truly common policy in the field of cooperation. 
cooperation agreements do constitute an important framework within 
which individual contacts between undertakings can be facilitated, 
although their importance should not be over-estimated, since they form 
the basis of only 10% of our relations with Eastern bloc countries2 • 
7. An encouraging feature is the number of sectoral agreements 
co~cluded since 1975 between the European Community and individual 
COMECON countries, particularly on steGl and textiles. 
1 
2 
on this point see Written Questions Nos. 939/79 by Mr Martinet and 
486/80 by the rapporteur. The Commission points out in its answers that 
the main differP.nce hetween a trade and a cooperation aqr<!ement il'l that, 
while the aim of the latter ia generally to dev~lop economic· rellltinn11 
be tween the parties concerned, it contains no spec i fie prov·is iCIIlPI on 
trade. The Commission acknowledges, however, that this distinction h 
a subtle one and fully shares the rapporteur's concern on this point. 
Based on statistics by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
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For example, in 1978 the European Community conCluded bilateral 
agreements for steal products with Czechoslovakia an1 Hungary (which 
allowed market penetration by these countries of up to 90% of Czech 
or Hungarian steel sales; under these agreements these countries 
undertook not to 1e11 their steel below a given SIC p~ice). Steel agreements 
along the same lines also exist with Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. The 
first textile agreement to come into force waswithRomania in November 1976 
(renewed in 1977), then with Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. However, these 
countries made reservations concerning the EEC territory to which the 
agreement was applicable. 1 
Talks were also held between the European community and East 
Germany, Poland and the USSR on fisheries. 
8. An agreement of exceptional importance is the first, and so far 
only, trade agreement, namely between the EEC and Romania on trade in 
industrial products, which was initialled this year. Under this agreement 
there will be no tariff concessions for impox:.ts of Romanian products 
into the Community, but import restrictions are to be abolished or sus-
pended according to the product concerned - this applies particularly to a 
number of Romanian products such as chemicals, fertilizers, glass and 
ceramics. For its part Romania has undertaken to increase and diversify its 
purchases of Community products. It is hoped that other Eastern bloc 
countries will follow the example of the only COMECON member to have accepted 
the community's invitation to conclude a bilateral trade agreement. 
This is not inconceivable, in view of the significant change that 
has come about in the attitude of the Spcialist countries towards the 
community. Whereas in the 1960s they tended to be antagonistic towards 
the EEC, in the 1970s their attitude changed, perhaps as a result of 
the famous speech by Leonid Brezhnev in 1972 in which he stated that he 
recognized 'the realities in Western Europe•. This speech left the way 
free for a number of COMECON countries and, soon afterwards, negotiations 
were started, leading to the results mentioned abovw. The fact that the 
first trade agreement has been concluded at a time when negotiations 
with COMECON are at a standstill is an indication that we may expect 
further approaches by individual countries. 
l 
Any agreement concluded by the Community with third countries refers to 
the territories to Which the:Treaty of Rome applies (Article 227 of the 
EEC Treaty), which include West .Berlin, on the ba.sis of a declaration by 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in annex to the Treaty. 
This d~ facto.situation Ls considered unacceptable by the socialist 
countr~es, wh~ch refuse to recognize Berlin as part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
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9. Lastly, in addition to its power to conclude trade agreements, the European 
community must also back this up with an effective autonomous credit policy. 
The wide range of goods offered by Western industrialized countries, 
and the combination of unsatisfied demand and the continuing shortage 
of foreign •~ahanfl in the COMECON countries, o•••t• GOftditions of com-
petition in which the granting of credits plays a dominant role. 
It is a regrettable fact that a veritable •credit race' is taking 
place, not only between the Member States of the European Community but 
also between the latter and other Western industrialized nations. Selec-
tive State intervention to subsidize national export industries has led 
to considerable differences in the terms of financinliJ, and this seriously 
distorts competition on export markets. 
Although the Court of Justice of the European communities has 
expressly stated that •export credits• fall within the autonomous powers 
of the European community, they still tend to be run on a national basis. 
Community harmohization in the field of export credits, particularly 
vis-a-vis COMECON countries, is making slow progress and it has so far 
proved impossible to coordinate the various national procedures and 
policies on the granting of credit. 
A positive feature, however, is that the Commission and the Member 
States have actively collaborated to reach the 'OECD Consensus' on·minimum 
interest rates and the maximum duration of export credits. 
This 'consensus' was first signed in ~une 1976 and renewed in February 
1978 for an indefinite period subject to annual review. 
All the member countries of. OECD are party to it except Iceland and 
Turkey. 
In the case of the EEC the consensus was ratified by a Council decision 
of 14 March 1977. 
In May 1980 the interest rates were increased slightly (+ 0.75% for the 
East European countries). However, in order to pursue a truly common commer-
cial policy, the community must first develop a common credit policy. 
After all, the granting of ~redit is a means of influencing trade flows 
and therefore the volume of credit and the conditions under which it is 
granted must be determined at Community level. 
This problem is however too complex to be dealt with in this study. 
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III. The state of institutional relations between the EEc·· and COMECON 
10. It should be stressed that the initiative to negotiate an agreement came 
from COMECON itself. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that, as 
institutions, the EEC and COMECON are very different in character. The deyrce 
of integration and the powers ·of COMECON, for inatanee, cannot be compared 
with those of the community7 the EEC has exclusive powers to pursue a 
common commercial policy, whereas COMECON has no such powers. Admittedly, 
COMECON as an institution may conclude agreements· but it has: no legal 
powers whatsoever to impose the implemantation of such an agreement on 
its members. Naturally, this situation creates serious problems. More-
over, COMECON has still not officially recognized the EEC - despite the 
current negotiations - though it did finally agree to negotiate with the 
conunission of the European communities (not with the council). 
11. For these reasons the Commission proposed that the projected agree-
ment should contain a detaiied preamble in whrh both parties express 
their desire to develop trade relations and agree that each individual 
COMECON country will conclude a bilateral agreement with the community 
for the purpose of implementing the agreement. This is one of the crucial 
points which .COMECON is still refusing to accept. 
12. What staqe has been reached in the~e negotiations? From the very 
outset the Commission and COMECON have differed as to the form an 
agreement should take and each side has rejected more or less explieitly 
the proposals put forward by the other. The Community did make an attempt 
to reach a compromise on a number of points, but the overwhelming 
impression is that COMECON is simply looking for new ways to formulate old 
proposals. In its most recent proposals it has revived its previous 
demands with regard to the 'most-favoured nation clause•, 'credit 
facilities' and 'non-discrimination', even in the agricultural sector! 
Although the Community must be deemed in a position to compromise on 
c'ertain points, COMECON is clearly quite unable to do so. 
con~Jequently, no agreement has yet been reached and it is stil.l 
impossible to predict when this will happen. The view recently expressed by 
the Commission Vice-President'Mr BAFERRAMP that consultations at political 
level should be· suspended unt'il COMECON adopts a more reasonable attitude 
suggests that there is a persistent state of incomprehension on the COMECON 
side. 
A detailed account of negotiations betw!'!rm the !o;l~C .1nd C'llMJl:C'IIN frnm 
the beginning to the present day, is given in Annex I. 
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IV. Specific problems of trade between the EEC arjd tbe COMECCJlll countries 
13. For Western European industries, trading with Eastern Europe is fraught 
with major problems. 
In virtua1ly ell East. European countries \bl,18Cket situation is 
totally different from ~hat in our Community, wtth its f~e market 
economy. Market tranapareacy is restricted to a minimum and the state 
undertakings or special commercial ~gencies through which.negotiations 
are conducted are boand by the strict rules of· the plann.a econoay. At 
the same time the East European countries do- not always wish to trade 
in their most competitive products but frequently in products for. which 
they have an export capacity but for which there· is little dema~d in the 
West (for instance, ·sensitive products, products t~ surplus in Europe, 
poor quality products and so on). 
In addition, most of these countries are ha~ing to contend with a serious 
shortage of hard currency, and in view of the deficit in their balance of 
trade with the west they are very anxious to step up their exports while at 
the same time adopting a fairly protectionist attitude towards certain <;>f our 
products. 
14. · Hence, the great difficulty for .these state-trading countries is to 
increase their exports to the EEC to the same e~tent as their imports 
from Western Europe. 
However, since East European state undertakings are often not in a 
position to compete with West European firms as regards selling their products 
on EEC Member States' markets, they tend to resort to practices which give 
them technical and financial advantages at the expense of the Community's 
industries, markets and emplQ¥ment: a typical example is the use of 
'compensation agreements' (barter deals, reciprocal purchasing arrangements, 
buy-back deals).· The deeper the recession in the West the greater the demand 
for countertransactions in the centrally planned economies, because of the loss 
of markets in the West, the lack of foreign exchange and the inability to 
switch the manufacturing industry's production at short notice to exportable 
itan s. 
It would therefore be useful to give a brief summary at this point of the 
various compensation arrangements. 
a. Compensation arrangements 
15. Barter transactions, i.. e. transac U ons in which goods are PXch.tO<JP<l ftu-
goods, have always formed the basis for foreign trade relations within 
COMECON. This is a result of the planned economy system used in the 
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Eastern bloc countries, which involves mutual commitments to supply and 
accept goods, and of the non-convertibility of East European currencies. 
16. In recent years such transactions have played an increasingly important 
role in COMECON's foreign trade with the West. The main reasons for this 
development are to be found in the disequilibrium of the Eastern bloc countries' 
trade balances, which need to be stabilized by drastically reducing imports 
and considerably increasing exports. 
The following reasons are advanced to account for this increase in 
compensation transactions: 
(1) owing to its high external debt and chronic shortage of foreign 
exchange, Eastern Europe is obliged to pay for its imports in kind; 
(2) These transactions make up for Eastern Europe's lack of a commercial 
policy and strategy. 
The poor sales organizations of East European countries and the low 
quality of goods on offer means they cannot be sold through the 
normal channels on Western marketer 
(3) The financing of imports not provided for in the plan. Since no 
foreign exchange has been budgeted for these imports, the likelihood 
of selling them is very small. The same applies to goods to which · 
the state authorities have attached a low priority (consumer goods, 
certain industrial goods). 
{4) The desire to establish firm links with Western undertakings with a 
view to the regular importation of advanced technologies. If, for 
instance, a Western exporter knows that he will have to buy back a 
proportion of the goods manufactured in the factory he is building 
in the Eastern bloc, then he has every interest in allowing his 
East European partners to enjoy the benefits of the latest techno-
logical developments and he will be more attentive to the quality of 
the goods produced. 
17. 'Compensation arrangements' is a general term covering a variety of 
different transactions ranging from the simple exchange of goods for goods 
to fully-fledged industrial cooperation. 
A distinction is normally made between the following types of transaction: 
- ~~~~~~-~~~~~ is compensation based purely on an exchange of goods 
without money being involved. 
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~-£~~~~!~~!~~-~~~!~~~!~~ is one in which a West.European supplier 
aqrees to accept part or full payment in merchandise. In compensation 
transactions the commitments to buy and to sell are regulated in a 
single contract, which makes the implementation of such transactions 
very complicated and time-consuming. 
Full compensation is similar to barter trading, although the West 
European and East European deliveries are paid for in cash - independ-
ently of each other - and the Western exporter has the possibility of 
transferring his obligation to buy to a third party. 
In the case of partial compensation the Western exporter receives a 
percentage of his payment in cash and the rest in East European goods. 
The disadvantage of partial compensation is that the Western exporter 
receives prompt payment for only a percentage of his supplies. He 
does not receive the remainder until a purchaserfor the East European 
goods has been found and has made his payment. At the moment about 
10 to 15% of all countertrade takes the form of compensation transactions. 
- ~~Sie~~~~!Je~~~~~!!~g-~~~~g~~!~~! constitute the.most common form of 
countertrade. Under this arrangement the Western exporter undertakes 
to buy East European goods ~alto th~_value of a given percentage of 
his supplies. The main difference between this system and compensation 
is that two separate contracts are concluded: one for the Western 
exporter's sale and one for his commitment to buy, each containing a 
reference to the other contract. Unlike compensation transactions, 
the exporter receives payment immediately after delivery is made and 
has time to look around for suitable goods and to fulfil his commitment 
to buy. The Western buyer must then make payment for the reciprocal 
purchases direct to the East European vendor. 
- In the latter two cases it is customary that the Western exporter is 
allowed to choose from a list of goods. The longer the list, the 
greater the likelihood of finding a product that can be sold relatively 
easily on Western markets. Even though the list may be long, there is 
not, however, complete freedom to choose which goods to take in compensa-
tion, because the c·ompensation goods on the list are· subdivided into 
product categories and a proportion of the goods must be taken from 
each one. 
- ~~~~~s~_e~~~£~-~~~~9~~~~~!· also known as buy-back deals or industrial 
compensation: this type of transact iOl' is gaining ground more rapidly 
than any other system. Under this procedure Western factories or 
industrial plant are purchased and paid for with products manufactured 
by the new plant (agreements of this kind are common, for instance, in 
the chemicals sector). 
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Under this arrangement the West European supplier accepts part-payment 
in goods manufactured with the plant supplied and with Western techno-
logy and know-how .. Payments made in this way may amount to as much as 
100% of the value of the goods supplied from Western Europe. until 
recently product payback arrangements usually covered between 20 and 30';1., 
of the overall payment, but this has risen in the last few years; 
there have even been cases where the Western exporter has had to sign 
long-term contracts to take goods for up to 200% of the value of the 
goods he originally supplied. 
- certain forms of ~~~~~!~~~!-~Q2E~~~!~Q~ are sometimes included under the 
general heading of compensation transactions: these may range from the 
transfer of licences to collaboration in joint undertakings. 
lastly, there is the ·~~!~~~· or ;!~~~~!~!-~~~~~~~!!~~· There are 
usually three or more countries involved in each switch transaction, one 
generally being an industrialized country, one an East European country 
and one a developing country. Between two of them, generally the East 
European country and the developing country, there will be a clearing 
agreement whereby the East European country can use its debt claim on the 
developing country as payment for a purchase in the industrialized country. 
In other words the socialist country's balance-of-payment surplus with a 
developing country is used as a means of payment to finance that same 
country's structural balance-of-payment deficit with an industrialized 
country. 
18. Generally speaking, where compensation transactions involve 
SQ~E!~~~~!~~y products, they do little harm to our economy; on the other 
hand, when they involve products which ~Q~E~~~ with Community products, 
these compensation deals can do serious damage to established or envisaged 
Community industries. They threaten existing markets or prevent the 
creation of new jobs. The European Community must take steps to avoid this 
happening, since these practices are very heavily and one-sidedly to the 
advantage of East European industries, in the following ways: 
(1) their industry is being built up on extensive Western credit 
(at subsidized interest rates); 
(2) the transfer of technology enables them to establish their own 
(competitive) industries; 
(3) these practices allow them access to markets which, without buy-
back deals, would be closed to them. 
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19. However, to put all these negative aspects into some kind of perspective, 
it should be pointed out that countertrade-does seem to fulfil a worth-
while function in East-West trade, particularly as a source of foreign 
exchange (fbr the East} and as a means of creating markets (for the West). 
countertrade can be advantageous to both sides: examples of this are the 
transactions between the Soviet Union and certain EEC countries whereby 
the former receives natural-gas pipelines and supplies, in return, raw 
materials which the Community lacks. 
Eastern bloc markets present a challenge and potential advantages to our 
exporters precisely because of the saturation of our and other markets. 
The only reasonable attitude, therefore, is to accept compensation trnns-
actions only under the most favourable conditions possible and to oppose 
them whenever they are detrimental to the interests of our consumers, 
producers or industries. 
20. As there is no common trade policy in this sector either, the Commission 
must be asked what it is in fact doing to enforce the powers it enjoys 
vis-a-vis the Member States of the Community and to ensure that practices 
'described above do not adversely affect the Community. 
This means in practice that the Cdmmission must be urged to draw up a 
-- -- ------ -------.-----------------
Code of practice for compensation arrangements with specific and strict 
norms, which will give it the power - as in the case of the European 
pr~visions on competition - to impose sanctions on practices that disturb 
the market. At the same time it must intensify its aurveillance by 
setting up a special service to investigate all compensation agreements, 
whose notification will be compulsory. 
b. Dumping by 'the COMECON countries in the goods and transport sectors of 
the Community 
21. Dumping by Eastern bloc countries is mainly concentrated in two sectors: 
(1) Dumping in the textile, steel and finished products sectors; 
(2) Dumping in the maritime transport and other sectors (maritime dumping}. 
/.2. ~icrious disturbances arc caused on the European market by vad ous 
<::OMJ·:coN countries disposing of their textiles and steel products below cosl. 
For these sensitive products the Europe~n community sh~~ld·;~n~luclc 
voluntary restraint agreements, with th~ COMECON countries so that 
products from these countries to the Community are exported at prices 
which do not cause market disturbances. 
- 22 - PE 78.596/fin. 
In other sectors too, the:zre are sign,s. -o~ an increase in the dumping 
of finished products of all kinds. The appended list speaks for itself 
and underlines the seriousness of the problem. 
Dumping of finished products by the Eastern bloc is quite common, but 
in many cases complaints come to nothing eithet because dumping is 
difficult to prove or because the Eastern bloc countries themselves 
voluntarily cut baCk their sales of these products or put up prices. 
Cases of dumping are generally characterized by the following features: 
(a) Normally the products involved are simple to manufacture, using 
technologies that are already well established in the west. 
(bl The products are often manufactured in the west in relatively 
uncompetitive conditions, by ~estern undertakings which are less 
modern than the more recent East European production centres. 
(c) Dumping complaints are normally made when the products from the 
Eastern bloc have already acquired a large market share to the 
detriment of domestic producers in the west. 
1 
Generally speaking, domestic producers do not react until they feel 
the adverse effects of dumping; complaints are seldom made before 
this stage, even when the prices of Eastern bloc products are very low 
(for example, LADA cars from the USSR). 
Once the anti-dumping complaint has been made, it is difficult to 
come up with concrete evidence. Internal wholesale prices are a 
state secret and are not published in any of the l!lastern bloc countr,ies. 
At the same time, the complicated pricing system (differences between 
internal and external prices) make the investigation procedure more 
difficult. Similarly, compensation arrangements are in fact a form 
of concealed dumping, where products are sold at reduced prices by 
representatives or firms specialized in. countertransactions. 
In many cases, in order to prove that products are being sold below 
their normal value, raw material prices and cost prices have to be 
estimated. 1 
~~~E!~= In the action brought by the Federation of British Printers 
aga1nst suppliers of Chris.tmas ~ards imported from the USSR ( 1978) it 
was found that the Russian price represented less than half of the wages 
and material costs, quite apart from manufacturing costs and overheads. 
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In most cases of dumping, Community action is made more difficult by 
----- - -
the continued--;~istence of differences in national regulations. The 
commission must therefore be urged once again to continue to harmonize 
the existing liberalization lists (replacing the present system of 
bilateral import q~otas) and to adapt them to current req~irements. 
23. Dumping on the community's transport markets. 
The procedure adopted by the COMECON countries in the fields of 
sea transport, inland waterway transport-and road transport in the 
1 
community is roughly as follows 
- Enterprises from the COMECON countries collaborate with Western shipping 
and transport undertakings or establish their own branch offices in 
the Community. (Western undertakings are not allowed to dQ this in 
COMECON countries.) 
- western importers and exporters are increasingly required to effect 
corresponding transactions through East European transport under-
takings. 
- Freight rates in the Member States of the European Community are 
undercut by up to 50%, with the result that such dumping practices 
are threatening the existence of increasing numbers o'f western 
undertakings. 
-----------
'Maritime' dumping in particular is steadily increaaing in these 
markets, with ships from COMECON countries accounting for 35% of 
sea traffic in the North Atlantic. 
Two factors explain this increase in tran$port by East European -
mainly Soviet - fleets : 
(l) The USSR stipulates in trade contracts concluded with 
Western partners that the goods must be transported in its 
own ships. 
(2) The Russian merchant fleet is playing an increasingly 
important role in transport in the North Atlantic, along 
the West African coast and in the Indian OCean. 
Its freight rates are considerably lower (from 15-20 to 40%) than the 
normal average Western rates. These differences are accounted for by the fact 
that the cost of depreciation and insurance for ships is borne by the state 
and because their labour- costs arc kept fairly low. 
1 Schmid Report- Doc. 89/78- (PE 51.342/fin.) p. 24 
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24. At the same time, the community appears to be in a paradoxical 
situation in which the very· countries that are affected by these dunping practices 
do not hesitate to offer extremely favourable conditions in contracts for the 
supply of vessels to the Eastern bloc. 1 
On 19 September 1918 the Council adopted a decision bon~erning the 
activities of certain third countries in the field of cargo shipping 
( ?B/744/EEC, OJ No. L 258 of 21. 9. 1978). The Council Decision of 15 December 1978 
c-~~lt.'.:cs ".:.o an ~.nformn.-t.:on system on cert<lin cargo lj ner routes. The Conunittce on 
r:xtf'!rnal r::conomic RE'!ln.tions' opinion on t.his problem is contained i.n -the report 
c'!:::-n.wn up :Jy r-1r K. JUNG2 • The system instituted provides for sanctions in the forn. 
of extra harbour dues or quotas if dumping is proved. 
The rapporteur has no information about the development and results of 
the new system. The pronounced silence of the Commission as regards practical 
results can only mean that the system has'proved a failure and is working 
either unsatisfactorily or not at all. It does seem that the Commission is to 
submit proposals to the Council in connection with this problem before the end 
of 1980. 'rhe rapporteur is sorry, however, that the Commission feels unable 
to provide the European Parliament with more information. 
c. German internal trade 
25. For several years now, the committee has been closely following the de-
velopment of German 'internal trade' and its possible repercussions on intra-
Community trade. The fears repeatedly expressed by various Member States as 
to potential abuses or disruption of the market have not, so far, proved to be 
ju'>tified. 
2G. As 1s well known, the Treaty of Rome makes prov~s~on for a special system 
Eor internal German trade, whereby the GDR is not subject, in respect of its 
t r·<Jdc• wJth the• FR(;, to Community customs regulations appli<'ahle to goods from 
I . d . ] t11r c·ountrJc•s. 
The Federal Republic of Germany, which upholds the principle that, though 
there are two German states, there is only one German nation, does not apply 
Community rules on trade with third countries to the GDR. This means that; 
1 Exam~le: In 1979 France signed a contrac-t with Poland for the supply of four 
---- -- ships, which will be sold to Poland at half their cost price with a 
state subsidy of FF 450 million. (See Le Mende, 27 Janu~ry 1979). 
2 Report on the EEC's relations with the COMECON countries in the field of 
maritime shipping. Doc. 51/79 - 11 April 1979. 
3 
see 'Protocol on German internal trade and connected problems'. 
~~~!~!!_! 'Since trade between the German territories subject to the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
territories in which the Basic Law does not apply is part of 
German internal trade, the application of this Treaty in 
Germany requires no change in the treatment currently accorded 
this trade.' 
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- Products from the GDR are not subject to Community customs tariffs, 
although they are subject to strict controls and special licencing 
procedures in the FRG; 
- Products from the GDR are not subject to the Community quota system, 
but to quotas imposed independently by the FRG depending on the 
state of the market 1 
- Agricultural products from the GDR sold in the Federal Republic 
are subject to the market regulations of the Federal agricultural 
agency; 
- To facilitate German internal trade, the Federal Republic of 
Germany grants the GDR an interest-free 'swing' credit, amounting 
to OM 850 million (This arrangement expires on 30.6.1982). 
27. The possible drawbacks of this special system which are most often 
cited concern potential abuse in connection with products' country of 
origin and the possibility of their entering the Community 'by the back 
door'. It should be pointed out, however, that it has been illegal to 
designate products as 'made in Germany' since 1.1.1970, and only the 
expression 'made in the GDR' should now be used. Such products can 
therefore no longer be confused with articles produced in the 
Federal Republic and re-exported on to the domestic Community market 
without payment of duties or levies. 
So-called 'back-door' entry - i.e. the possibility for other CMEA 
f'' ~~ries to put their goods onto the community market via the GDR and 
.. --• · FRG - did in fact lead to a certain amount of abuse in the 1975-
c ·Jd period, particularly in the textile sector. The Federal Republic 
~.1ereupon increased controls and the relevant GDR quotas for textile 
products have been frozen since 1978. No further abuses of this kind 
have been reported since. 
28. Moreover, German internal trade is recorded by the Federal Office 
of Statistics, which publishes the relevant figures on a monthly basis. 
~35% of the industrial goods the GDR sends to the FRG,and 86% of the 
agricultural products are subject to quotas of this kind. 
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Furthenrore 1 the Federal Ministry for Econanic Affairs produces six-nonthly 
reports on this trade (volume and break-down) 1 which are forwarded to the 
Commission of the EC. 1 
29. It is worth pointing out that, apart fran the above-mentioned 'swing' 
-credit system, the GDR receives no state-subsidized or guaranteed credit 
fran the FRG I and that internal German trade proceeds, for the rest, on the 
basis of customary commercial practice - bank loans or credit from suppliers. 
30. The percentage of products entering the RFG fran the GDR and then 
exported into other EC countries is negligible: 0. 8% of the goods the DDR 
sells to the FRG 1 which is equivalent to about 0.02% of all the 
Federal Republic's exports to other EC countries. 
!Goods delivered to the FRG fran the GDR anounted to J:l.1 5. 6 thousand million 
in 1981 (5.3 in 1980), while deliveries of products fran the FRG to the GDR 
reached DM 6.1 thousand million (5.6 in 1980) · 
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A positive feature, however, is the fact that the EEC is tending to look 
upon the GDR more and more as a third country, with all that this implies, 
not least for the Federal Republic. 
d. Que@tion! in eonnection with trade in agriqultijra1 products 
31. So far there have been few problems with agricultural products, since 
products from COMECON countries are treated in the same way as those from 
other third countries in that the rules of the common agricultural policy are 
applied in full. In fact, if anything, it is the East Euxopean countries 
that complain about our Common Agricultural Policy, as the fairly protection-
istic nature of the CAP is a considerable obstacle to their exports of 
agricultural products (which, after all, account for an important share 
of COMECON's exports to the Community) and as they find it hard to accept 
that products from developing countries should be given preferential treat-
ment. Even so, their dissatisfaction is by no means entirely justified seeing 
that they also benefit from low-price sales of products when there is a large 
surplus (for instance, butter sales to the USSR). 
There is also the fact that a number of COMECON countries regularly 
suffer from shortages of certain agricultural products and therefore the 
Commission should look carefully at ways of making optimum use aE East 
European markets without according the countries concerned special preferences 
and without adversely affecting the Common Agricultural Policy. 
e. The trade embargo problem 
32. The embargo problem is not a new one. The embargo policy instrument, 
COCOM, the prime aim of which is to stop the export of strategic goods to the 
Soviet Union, dates from 1947. 
The Member States of COCOM (Coordination Committee) - which was formally 
instituted on 1 January 1950 - are the same as those of NATO with the exception 
of Iceland and Japan. Since its original version the embargo list of goods 
corresponding to given criteria has often been amended and adjusted. 
In recent years, however, there has been some displeasure about the 
existence of this list. Most of the criticism has been from American 
industry which has claimed that the COCOM system is very detrimental to the 
American economy, that the embargo list is inefficient and out-of-date and 
that the embargo is only too often circumvented by firms from other 
industrialized countries. 
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Although consideration is being given to the abolition of the COCOM 
system, certain sources believe that this would deal a heavy blow to certain 
European industries since some major European contracts with the Eastern bloc 
would never have been concluded without the enforced absence of American 
competitioh. 
33. From a more general point of view one could question the advisability of 
an embargo policy at all. 
Often an embargo fails to attain its intended goal. Earlier ~xamples show 
that an embargo directed against a particular country have often ·encouraged 
that country to consolidate its potential productivity. It could also be asked 
whether it might not be more efficient to make the party which is the target 
of the embargo more, rather than less, dependent since this would also reduce 
the danger of an open conflict situation. 
With regard to the European embargo problem, the EEC Council declared 
on 15 January 1980, following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the 
consequent American wheat embargo, that the Commission must take the necessary 
steps to ensure that it was not circumvented by EEC food deliveries to the 
Soviet Union. Subsequently the Community promised the United States that it 
would only maintain the conventionul current trade relations with the USSR. 
As the US embargo ought not to be circumvented by EC exports, the commission 
should - in the opinion of the rapporteur - tighten up its checks on the 
destination of products, as it already has done in the case of butter and 
wheat sales. It should also be noted that the impact of a US embargo is not 
the same as that of a European embargo since Europe has more dependent trade 
relations with the Eastern bloc than her Atlantic allies. 
conscquenlly, nlthough agreement may be recorded to the principle of an 
embaryo policy, the European Community should dVoitl making it so strkl that. 
it might harm the Common Agricultural Policy or the European consumer. 
f. The problem of Eastern European debts 
34. Since the second half of the sixties trade between the EEC and Eastern 
Europe has progressed satisfactorily and kept pace with the general develop-
ment of the Common Market's international trade relations. There are however 
possible changes on the way, partly as a result of the economic situation in 
the West and partly as a result of the constant growth of the Eastern 
European countries' debts to the industrialized countries. The net debt of 
the Socialist countries whichwas only US $ 6,000 million in 1971 is put at 
us $ 64,600 million for 1979. 
The following table shows the growth of the debt positions of the various 
Eastern European countries with regard to the West. 
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CURRENCY DEBT OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIESl 
=========================================== 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Total 
Gross 8 357 11.047 14.965 22.317 36.401 47~~661 56,577 68 947 77 130' 
Net 51987 7 518 10 570 161175 28,899 38,869 48,244 58 303 64,660 
Bul_garia 
Gro~Js 743 1,009 1,020 1,703 2,640 3,198 3,707 4 263 4 500 
Net 723 909 997 1,360 2,257 2 756 3.169 3 710 3,730 
czechoslovakia 
Grose 485 630 757 1,048 1.132 1 862 21_616 3 206 4L_020 
Net 160 176 273 640 827 l_L 434 21_121 2 513 3_, 07Q 
GDR 
Gross 1,408 1 554 2 136 3,136 51_188 5,856 7,145 8,894 10,140 
Net 1,205 1L_229 1_~876 2,592 3,548 5,047 6,159 7 548 8,440 
Hungary 
Gross 1,071 1 192 1,442 2,129 3,135 4,049 5,655 7 473 8 020 
Net 048 1 055 1 096 1.537 2_~~ 195 2,852 4l491 6 I ') ~_2-_l.t. .. U .. Q 
Poland 
Gross 1,138 1 564 2, 796 4,643 8,014 11,483 13,967 17,844 21,100 
Net 764 1,150 2,213 4,12.0 7 381 10,680 13 532 16, 972 20 000 
Romania 
Gross 1. 227 1 249 1,611 2,693 2 924 2_~903 3._605 51_221 6_._950 
Net 1,~227 11_204 1,495 2_._483 2 449 2,528 3 388 4,992 6,700 
USSR 
Gross 1,807 2 409 3_, 749 5,176 10,578 14,853 15,728 17,227 17. 2~~ 
Net 582 555 1_, 166 1,654 7,451 10, ll5 11 230 11,217 10,2001 
Comecon 
5, 2001 banks2 478 1 240 1,454 1,789 2,790 3,457 4,154 4,819 
(in $ million) 
l Source: 'Estimated Soviet and East European Hard Currency Debt' 
A Research Paper - National Foreign Assessment Center, 
ER 80-10327, June 1980 
2 International Investment Bank 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation 
These are the two banks set up under the auspices of COMECON 
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Of the credits totalling US$ 77,100,000, 6~~ was granted by private 
Wcctcrn banks and 31% by public institutions. Calculation of the debt 
repayment ratio1 for each of the Eastern European countries concerned gives 
the following picture: 
USSR 
POLAND 
GDR 
HUNGARY 
ROMANIA 
BULGARIA 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
18% 
92% 
54% 
37% 
22% 
38% 
22% 
35. If we bear in mind that according to criteria operated by international 
banks, a debt repayment ratio of more than 3~~ is too heavy a burden, we can 
see that Poland is in an unenviable position. The USSR, Romania and 
Czechoslovakia can be regarded as normal risks, and Hungary and Bulgaria are 
somewhat in excess of the generally accepted norms but in the case of the 
GDR and particularly Poland facilities will most probably have to be granted 
in the future which perhaps run counter to the 'OECD Consensus'. In 1980 
Poland will have to find US $ 7-8,000 million to discharge its currency debts 
and this can only be done by refinancing on the basis of market interest 
rates and no longer on favourable interest terms since this would conflict 
with the OECD Consensus. 
Extension of payment terms is equally impossible since the maximum finan-
cing period is 8~ years. In our opinion international concentration will be 
necessary to find a sol~tion to this problem. 
v. The importance of East-West trade - some fundamental points 
36. In view of the difficulties and problems involved in establishing and 
maintaining trade relations with Eastern bloc countries, many people may wonder 
whether these trade relations are in fact useful and desirable, and indeed 
whether it is worthwhile for the Community to make such efforts to intensify 
contacts if at the same time it must remain vigilant and fight to prevent 
practices by Eastern bloc countries that disturb the market. 
This may be answered as follows: 
Despite the considerable differences between the two economic entities, 
an agreement between the Community and COMECON and its member states is 
desirable on both political and economic grounds. From the political viewpoint 
1 The debt repayment ratio is obtained by dividing the currency capital and 
interest amounts by the figure for currency revenue from export transactions 
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- a~q ~P. ~p~ co~~ext of the Final Act of Helsinki - it is absurd th~~ ~h~ 
E~C ~hqq~d ~ntertain normal trade relations with every country in the world 
1 ,. 
anq corc~qq~ ~~ecific agreements with a large number of them, while at tpe 
s~~~ ti~e its relations with its nearest neighbours have still to be 
norroaHze~. P'l'OIII an economic viewpoint it is cl .. l' that tnany trade contacts 
are cqr,~~nuing to develop and therefore it is time to establish a stable 
le~a:j. basis for these reciprocal economic relations. 
~7. It can, generally speaking, be said that, whatever form the reciprocal 
or pilateral trade relations take, East-West trade by its nature offers con-
siderable advantages to both sides; 
The facts speak for themselves: four-fifths of East-West trade is based 
on agreements with European countries and the EEC countries account for 
around two-thirds of these trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe. 
In certain industrial sectors the COMECON countries have become the 
Nine's largest customer; one-fifth of the ~G's sales of metal-working 
machinery, pipelines and sheet steel go t~ the COMECON countries 1• Moreover, 
the West is turning more and more to the S~viet Union and Eastern Europe 
for its supplies of natural gas, oil, ur~~i~~ and other important raw materials. 
Even under the highly controversta~ ~y-pack deals,West European firms 
can supply industrial plant to East Eu~pp,9n countries and in exchange have 
products manufactured more cheaply thap,. ~r, ~P.~ir own country. In many cases 
the transfer of technology is conside!~4 a~ the price the West has to pay 
in order to acquire new markets, which ~~ ~ great advantage of industrial 
cooperation for the West. Also, more apq ~ore Western concerns are investing 
in Eastern Europe in the hope that theiF c~operation with COMECON countries 
will give them a foothold in the Third ~orlq markets from which they have 
hitherto been excluded. Indeed, trip~tit~ agreements involving an OECD 
country, a COMECON country and a dev~~op~~g country are becoming more and 
more rrequent. 
38. Imports of Western technology and plant have played an important role 
' ,. 
in the industrial development of th~ E~§~~~n ~~oc countries over the past 
ten years. The growth of East-West ~rade has enabled them to diversify their 
imports and exports and thereby g~i~ :mo~e freedom of movement vis-a··vis 
the Soviet Union. 
1 Manufactured and semi-manufactured goods account for more than 90% of 
Community sales to COMECON, 4.0% of. C~CON' s imports from the Community 
consist of machinery and capital goods.' In recent years the share of 
consumer goods in COMECON's overall i~ports frr)m the Cownunity lt<lf; .Jinn 
risen; the main products beinc; ayr.icultural •. wrl foocl prodttr·t n; n11l•·11 
are effected on the bnsis of lon,J-lerm coulr.H:tn 
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These few advantages underline the importance of East-West economic 
relations and show that - in spite of the various drawbacks - a reasonable 
and rational approach towards East-West trade can benefit both sides. 
VI. The oil crisis and the COMECON countries1 
I 
39. What have been the consequences of the oil crisis for the COMECON 
countries and its repercussions on East-west relations? 
-With the exception of Poland with fts coal industry and Romania with 
its oil and gas reserves, the East Eur9pean countries look primarily 
to the Soviet Union for their energy supplies 2• 
As a result, the economic dependence of these countries on the Soviet 
Union is growing. 
And the need to secure the supplies of energy and raw materials which 
are crucial to their future development will induce COMECON member states 
to invest more and more in major projects in the Soviet Union and thereby 
fulfil the USSR's desire for more planning- and, particularly, more 
energy planning - within the COMECON organization. Because of its 
abundant oil reserves, the USSR's trading position is steadily improving: 
for instance it has been able to cut its trade deficit with the indus-
trialized Western nations from $3,350 million to $1,130 million. In an 
effort to boost its revenue from oil exports still further, the USSR has 
increased its exports while at the same time keeping closely in line with 
OPEC price increases. 
The trading position of the other Eastern bloc countries, on the 
other hand, has worsened as a result, since they need to pay part 
of their growing oil bill in foreign currency. 
- Furthermore, it is already clear that recourse will have to be 
made more and more to imports of oil from the Gulf States. 
1 
What problems does: this create for the East European countries? 
First, it makes their need for hard curren~y all the more acute. 
§9~ES~~ . 'De Financieel en Economische Tijd' (Belgian daily newspaper) 
- 'The effects of Energy Development on East European Economic 
Prospects' by Tony Seaulan. Nato colloquium 1980. 
2 Since 1974 the USSR has been the world's main oil producer and traditionally 
exports 20 - 29% of its output. Soviet exports of crude oil to w~stern 
Europe rose last year by 17%, while those to Eastern Europe rose by only 
,2%. rn·spite of this, the lion's share, namely 75.3 million tonnes 
still went to COMECON countries. 69.2 million tonnes went to western 
Europe. 
- 33 - PE 78.596/fin. 
Eastern Europe will therefore try to use as little hard currency as 
possible and pay instead in ~ind with machines, factories, chemicals and, 
in some cases, agricultural products. However, the problem is that it will 
be difficult for Eastern Europe to find products in which the oil-exporting 
countries ate ihterested: for they are already e~porting their best products 
to Europe in exchange for essential Western technology and so as to reduce 
their indebtedness. 
40. It is to be expected, therefore, that the COMECON countries will, on 
the one hand, continue to cut down their imports from the West in order 
to pay for their expensive oil and, on the other hand, will step up 
their exports to the West in order to obtain the vital foreign exchange. 
Finally, the growing scarcity and rising cost of raw mat:erials bode ill 
for the economic growth of the East European countries. 
41. Because of the need to export, there is little room for inves~nt or 
for improvement of living standards in Eastern Europe itself. 
- In short, the impact of the energy crisis ori CbMECON countries is such that 
either: 
- they will be obliged to collaborate in joint COMECON projects 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union: they will try to 
conclude more compensation agreements with the Soviet Union 
(on the lines of the Orenburg gas project, and the Khmelnitsky 
(Ukraine) nuclear power station), but in this field they 
will come into competition with non-COMECON countries: 
or: 
- they will have to obtain more credit - either from the west 
or from the Soviet Union - to keep up with the rise in prices 
or: 
l 
of raw materials (the Soviet Union has already granted loans 
to every country in the Eastern bloc). 
I 
they will try - again in competition with western countries 
to export their existing technology and !products to the 
developing countries in exchange for energy supplies. 
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VII. Future prospects 
42. When looking at the various forms of trade relations between the Community 
and COMECON and/or its members, we must also consider prospects for the future. 
up to now, trade between the Community and state-trading countries has developed 
satisfactorily and in the 1970s particularly there was a mark8d expantion 
in East-we•t trad•1• Hpwever, a slowing down in Sa•t•W••t trade is now 
generally expected in what has actu~y been a record year. In 1979, overall 
East-West trade was 23% up on 1978. Exports from OECD countries rose by 
around 17% to $38,000 millio~.,while imports from Eastern Europe rose by around 
nne-third to $35,000 million. At the same time, the total indebtedness of 
-COMECON countries via-a-vis the West reached $65,000 million at the end of 1979 
i.e. an increase of $6,000million (or 10.2%) over 19782 • 
43. Various reasons are advanced to explain this slowing down in East-West 
trade: 
1 
2 
recent tensions in international politic3 are thought to have cast a shadow 
over future trade _prospects~.' 
the depression of 1975 and relative weakening of the European economies 
have reduced the import capacity of European countries; 
there was a definite decline in economic activity in the East European 
countries during the second half of the 70s and none of the countries 
concerned is expected to reach the target of 6.3% growth set in the 
1976-80 five-year plans~ 
the protectioniEattitude of the EEC vis-a-vis all other countries. 
In 1966 61% of our imp~ts from the Eastern bloc came from three of the ten 
product categories used to classify international trade; in 1977 the 
percentage fell to 38.9%. The goods in question are from our traditional 
manufacturing industries, which have become particularly vulnerable in 
recent years; 
the privileged relations which the. BBC has establi·shed with the three 
new applicant countries, the Mediterranean countries, the ex-EFTA countries 
and the ACP countries, have had a trade-diverting effect by giving preference 
to exports from these countries at the expense of the East European countries. 
Total exports and imports between industrialized countries and the Eastern 
bloc rose from $15,000 million in 1970 to more than $73,000 million in 
1979; the rapid growth in imports of Western capital goods and technology 
by the COMECON countries was the main ·driving force behind the rapid 
expansion of East-West trade. 
~o-thirds of the debts of the East European countries are with Western 
commercial banks and one-third with government and semi-state bodies 
(Poland is by far t~ largest debtor in the Eastern bloc with debts of 
$18,500 million). 
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The industrialization of certain Third World countries, which normally 
concentrate on the manufacture of semi-finished products, and the emergence 
of •workshop• countries, where wage levels are four time lower than in the 
Socialist countries, have had the same effect: 
faced with their worsening trade balance and growing foreign debt, the 
Socialist countries have taken a series of measures to remedy a situation 
which was threatening to become critical. In the meantime, however, they 
have also put a brake on the development of Zast-West relations: 
finally, a very important factor is the effect of the energy crisis 
on East-West relations. According to the Austrian Institute 
for Comparative Economic Studies, in order to pay for their oil the 
member states of COMECON will have to direct more and more of their 
exports towards the Soviet Union,which could then prevent Eastern bloc 
countries from developing their economic relations with the West (Le Mende, 
25.4.80). 
44. The general outlook is as follows: because of the COMECON countries' 
growing indebtedness (with the exception of the Soviet Union) their economic 
policy will be directed towards export-oriented growth over the next few years. 
This policy will have repercussions on the level of their imports, particularly 
that of capital goods from the West, and demand will be mainly for goods and 
technology that can promote economies in raw materials and energy. The 
future development of COMECON cooperation must therefore be seen against this 
background. 
VITI. Conclusions 
45. To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn. Your rapporteur 
feels that the Commission should be congratulated for the cautious and 
sensible manner in which it has conducted its negotiations with COMECON. 
one cannot stress strongly enough that any agreement with state-trading 
countries, and in particular with COMECON as an organization, must include 
reciprocity in some form or another. This means that the Community does not 
intend to grant development aid in whatever form to East European industries 
or to the Soviet Union. In this respect the Commission's demands in connection 
with the text of the preamble are crucial to the conclusion of an agreement. 
At the same time the Community must never accept that a particular 
agreement with COMECON as an org~ni~ation should take precedence over agree-
ments between the Community and the industrialized COMECON countries. Any 
such solution is unacceptable to us on legal, political and economic grounds. 
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46. Tt is nol possible legally because COMECON has no supra-n.JUonal powers--
nor, for political reasons, would we wish it to; from the political angle 
such a course of events would be most undesirable since it would help to 
strengthen the Soviet Union's grip on the East European countries, and that 
is not our aim. 
47. From an economic viewpoint such a priority may be equally unacceptable, 
given the considerable differences between the respective structures and the 
various economic links between the European Community and its individual Member 
States. Here again we ara opposed to the individual COMECON countries 
becoming too economically dependent on the Soviet Union. Lastly, it should 
not be forgotten that, in spite of the COMECON-EEC dialogue, some members of 
COMECON are already standing up for their own economic interests by establishing 
individual relations with the Community outside the jurisdiction of COMECON. 
48. The rapporteur considers that the EEC .. 1ust give priority to separate trade 
agreements with individual COMECON trading partners. The main argument in 
support of this view is that agreements that promote trade itself can and 
must be concluded with the COMECON countries individually. Bilateral agreements 
of this kind take account of the intrinsic characteristics and requirements 
of each country; for, although these contaats are with state-trading countries, 
there are considerable differences between their respective systems. Our 
contacts must take account of this and must ultimately satisfy the economic 
needs of each individual COMECON member, needs which must at the same time 
be compl~ntary to our own Community requirements. Over the past ten years 
a number of economic links have been established between East and West which 
we have no wish to abandon, given that this would entail disadvantages for 
all concerned. The disadvantages would be considerably greater for the small 
COMECON and West European countries than for the USSR and the USA. Lastly, 
it should be stressed that economic1policy is the only field in which East 
European countries enjoy a certain autonomy and are'less subject to Soviet 
influence. 
49. This does not mean that the Euzopean Community should approach negotiations 
with COMECON as an organization with any less resolve; in the view of the EP, 
h"W•"'ver. i l lllllfit ~~ iv<t prim·ity to agreemnuta with Lhn inO.iv.icluaJ eounl·rit•fl, 
but in such a way that these relations do not adversely affect our industries 
and EEC markets. Your rapporteur hopes, therefore, that the Commission will 
intensify its trade relations with the individual East European countries 
and will take great care that certain practices referred to above are curbed 
or stopped completely. 
In conclusion: 
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_ the autonomous import policy needs to be supplemented by realistic community 
lists of liberalized products: 
- a common export policy should be framed which would provide for the 
promotion of our agricultural exports and an effective c~on c~edit policy: 
- stricter measures are needed to counteract dumping: 
-a proper community monitoring system must be set up to keep·trade between 
East and West Germany within agreed limits and, 
- if possible a code of conduct for 'compensation' agreements should be 
drawn up. 
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ANNEX I 
- 1957 
HISTORY OF EEC-COMECON RELA~NS 
Publication in the Russian periodical KOMMUNIST of '17 propositions 
on the Common Market' formulating the ideological bases of Russian 
opposition to European union. 
Publication in PRAVDA of the '32 propositions on imperialist 
integration in Western Europe' containing sharp criticism of the 
European communities while at the same time noting that the 
existence of the EEC does not imply cooperation between the existing 
economic blocs in Europe. 
Following a Soviet 'aide-m6moire' on tariff reductions, the 
Community declares that it desires a normalization of relations. 
- 1972, March and December • 
Declaration by Mr Brezhnev on the recognition of 'realities' in 
Europe. 
- October 1972 
The meeting of Heads of State and Government of the EEC expresses 
its readirtess to encourage a policy of cooperation with the Eastern 
European countries. 
- July 1973 
COMECON approaches the EEC and declares its desire for closer 
contacts. 
- May 1974 
The Council of the EEC declares that the Community is prepared to 
negotiate on trade agreements with each of the Eastern European 
countries, taking account of the realization of the EEC's common 
CG!.Jmercial policy. 
- September 1974 
Mr Fadeyev, Secretary of COMECON, invites President Ortoli to visit 
Moscow to discuss relations between the two organizations. Mr 
Ortoli accepts in principle and immediately proposes that preparatory 
talks should be started at official level. 
- November 1974 
Following up the declaration of May 1974 the Commission forwards 
an outline trade agreement to the Eastern European states. 
- 4-6 February 1975 
First talks in Moscow between a delegation from the Commission and 
a delegation from the COMECON secretariat. Both delegations agree 
that the talks should be continued. 
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- 16 February 1976 
Mr G. Thorn (President of the Council of Ministers) receives a 
message from Mr G. Weiss (President of the Executive Committee of 
COMECON). 
COMECON puts forward a proposal for a eortelusion of a framework 
cooperation agreement between the EEC (and Member States) and 
COMECON (and Member States) known as the Weiss proposal. The 
bulk of the proposal concerns the commitments to be entered into 
by the Member States of both organizations as regards mutual trade 
relations. 
- 17 November 1976 
The Community (the Council) replies with a letter and a proposal 
for a draft agreement to Mr Olszewski, President of the Executive 
committee of COMECON. This proposal provides for the institution 
of working relations between the two organizations (the exchange of 
information on general subjects such as economic prospects, production 
and consumption, trade statistics, standardization and management 
of the environment), and for the trade aspects to be regulated by 
bilateral agreements between the Community and the individual COMECON 
countries. 
The community expresses its readiness to enter into negotiations 
immediately. 
- lH April 1917 
Mr K. Olszewski (President of the Executive Committee of COMECON) 
proposes an exchange of views with the President of the Council of 
Ministers on the form future talks should take. 
- 25 July 1977 
Mr Simonet, President of the Council of Ministers, accepts the 
prpposal for a meeting and proposes that Mr Haferkamp take charge 
of negotiations with COMECON. 
- 21 september 1977 
The proposed meeting in held in Brussels. COMECON's representative 
is Mr Marinescu, Vice-Premier of Romania and President of the 
Executive Committee of COMECON. 
Both parties agree to enter into negotiations with the aim of 
concluding an agreement between the two organizations during the 
first half of 1978. 
- March/April 1978 
Decision for Mr Baferkamp to have a meeting with Mr Fadeyev. 
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- 29 and 30 May 1978 
Meeting between Mr Haferkamp (Vice-President of the Commission of 
the European Communities) and Mr Nikolai Fadeyev (Secretary-General 
of COMECON) in Moscow. 
Agreement between the parties on a number of points set out in an 
annexed memorandum7 the eventual agreement to stipulate that each 
party must re~pect the practices, objectives and institutional 
rules of the other party and that each party should negotiate in 
accordance with its own internal procedure. 
- 25 and 28 July 1978 
Meeting of experts in Brussels. 
The delegation of experts from the Secretariat of COMECON and the 
individual Member States led by Mr Velkev and the delegation from 
the Community led by Sir Roy Denman proceed to an exchange of views 
on the area of application and the provisions of a cooperation 
agreement. 
- 22 and 25 November 1978 
Meeting in Brussels between Mr Fadeyev and Mr Haferkamp. In a 
personal initiative the latter makes a compromise proposal con-
cerning the parties to such an agreement and the provisions relating 
' to trade. His proposal goes as far as the EEC is prepared to go. 
Mr Fadeyev promises a reply by February 1979. 
- 22 March 1979 
Mr Katushev, President of the Executive Committee of COMECON, delivers 
to the French Embassy a letter addressed to Mr Fran~ois-Poncet, 
President of the Council of the EEC, repeating COMECON's proposals. 
A new meeting is proposed. 
- 10 May 1979 
Mr Haferkamp replies to this letter. 
He accepts the suggestion of another meeting but states that 
COMECON should first reply to his proposal. 
The letter also points out that letters should be addressed to the 
Commission of the EEC as the body responsible for conducting the 
negotiations. 
- 2 July 1979 
Letter from Mr Fadeyev. 
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Mr Haferkamp's letter ignored: COMECON proposes a new text. The 
COMECON proposal is virtually identical in content to its earlier 
proposals. 
Invit:ktic!Jn to hold the next meeting in Moscow. 
- 26 to 28 November 1979 
Meeting at political level in Moscow. 
_ exchange of views on existing draft agreements: the EEC submits 
a new proposal: 
- negotia tiona not cone luded: 
_ decision that further formulation of a draft shall be carried out 
by a group of experts in Geneva (February-March 1980): 
_ need to discuss again a number of fundamental issues at political 
level: 
- the EEC unable to accept that commercial problems 
be eovered by an outline agreement: but no objection 
to including most-favoured nation clause. COMECON 
has no common commercial policy and therefore no 
negotiations with COMECON possible on this question: 
such agreements to be coneluded with ita member 
states individually: 
- the EEC unable to accept that the agreement cover 
industrial, technological and scientific cooperation: 
- the EEC unable to accept that individual Member 
States of the community also be parties to the 
agreement: 
- the EEC opposed to setting up of a joint committee 
with general powers to discuss ~specta of mutual 
relations. 
~The EEC does not reject the most-favoured 
nation clause as such, but simply opposes the 
inclusion of this clause in the outline agree-
ment: is prepared, however, to include it in 
bilateral agreements with the individual 
members of COMECON. 
- a reference to the importance of trade between the 
two parties included in the preamble to ita draft 
agreement: 
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• - --~- -- M • ---·· ----- --
- both parties to·· undertake in the agree•nt to 
prom~te and develop mutual trade and no· ~~er of 
COMICON obliged to conduct trade negotiation• with 
the BBC if ·unwilling to do ao; 
.. th• ~ states ·of COliBCQ.:, aa tM11 a1 OCMic.ON 
itself, may be parties to the agreement. 
December 1979 
'Baferkamp returns •tisfied fran Moscow'~ 
Li• So far no progrese made. 
- March 1980 
Meeting of ~perta in. ~enava. 
- 31 March 1980. 
• f'l' ' •• ) 
Statement. by Mr Haferkamp: 'No more top-l.Vei. contacts between 
the Ccmmunity and COMBCON'. 
- Mr -~f~ka~p wishes, however, to c~tinue .technical contacts. 
between officials (in the hope of this ieiding to fresh contacts 
at top level): 
- Mr Haferkamp emphasizes, however, t~ Canmunity' a willingness 
to conclude an agreement with CCMBC<»t. 
- l(i July 1980 
Resumption of BEC-COMBCON talks at expert level in Geneva. 
Result: the parties return home once again without accomplis~ing 
their object: no agreement reached. 
- 15 and 17 October 1980 
Meeting of experts in Geneva. 
Little progress on fundamental differences. 
The EEC delegation proposes the organization of a further meeting 
in January 1981. This meeting to take account of the results of 
the CSCE meeting in Madrid (November 1980). 
Present situation: Totally divergent views held by both parties on the 
nature of a future agreement. 
COMECON wants the ag~eement to regulate directly trade relations between the 
two organizations. 
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The ~ opposition to this is well known: there can be no question of a 
trade agreement between the Caamunity and COMEC~ since: 
- the degree of _integration and the powers of COMEC~ bear no comparison 
with those of the Community, and 
- COMEC~' s powers, particularly as regards trade, are altogether different 
from those of the European Community. 
Moreover, the BBC will not contemplate a Joint committee set up by COMBCON 
to supervise the implementation of the agreement. 
The Community IS prepared to conclude bilateral trade agreamente with any 
member of COMBC~ (as it already has done, for instance, with Ranania). The 
BBC also requires that the agreement apply to West Berlin and be signed by 
the Community as such. 
COMECON refuses to countenance the above stipulations. 
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ANNEX II 
LIST OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENTS BETWBEN THE EEC MEMBER STATES AND 
THE COMECbN COUNTRIES (as at 31.12.1979) 
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Ranania 
Czechoslovakia 
USSR 
Vietnam 
China 
26.3.1975 
31. 8.1974 
20.2.1975 initialled, signed 6.10.1975 
22.11.1973 and Five-year Agreement from 10.4.1975 
27.5.1976 
10.10.1967 duration unspecified, supplemented by 
agreement of 10.9.1975 
19.11.1974 
11.10.1977 
26.11. 1979 
2. !!~!!!!-~!f~!!£_~!-~!=~~~ 
Bulgaria 
Hung'-ry 
Poland 
Romania 
czechoslovakia 
USSR 
China 
3. Denmark 
-------
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romqnia 
c zec!hoslovakia 
USSR 
Vietnam 
China 
4. France 
------
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
14.5.1975 
11.11.1974 
1.11.1974 and Agreement of 11.6.1976 
29.6.1973 
22.1.1975 
19.5.1973 
30.10.1974 (supplementary agreement) 
24.10.1979 
22.4.1975 
21.2.1974 
14.2.1976 
20. ll. 1974 
29.8.1967 and 1.12.1976 
9.11.1970 
28.8.1975 
1.6.1977 
14.9.1979 
13.11.1974 and Five-Year Agreement from 19.3.1975 
19.7~1973 
11.7.1975 (supplementary agreement) 
9.11.1974 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
Poland 
Romania 
Czechoslovakia 
USSR 
Vietnam 
China 
!!!!!E!~-~~.:!.l 
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Czechoslovakia 
USSR 
China 
!E!!:t 
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Ranania 
Czechoslovakia 
USSR 
China 
Netherlands 
-----------
Bulgaria 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Ranania 
czechoslovakia 
USSR 
China 
5.10.1972 and Five-Year Agreement from 1975 
28.7.1975 
23.2.1970 
Nov. 1977 (supplementary agreement) 
27.10.1971 
9.11.1974 
6.12.1974 (supplementary agreemen~) 10 years 
April 1979 (supplementary agreement, not yet 
27.4.1977 
. 4.12.1978 
19.5.1974 
18.12.1973 
signed) 
21.3.1972 duration unspecified 
20.3.1973 
16.12.1976 for five years 
15.6.1972 for five years 
8.9.1972 for five years 
6.5.1974 
4.3.1979 
27.5.1974 and Five-Year Agreement from 23.6.1975 
18.4.1973 
25.5.1974 
17.1.1974 (long-term programme) 
28.10.1975 agreement for 1980-1984 
22.5.1973 
30.4.1970 duration unspecified 
25.7.1974 
October 1979 (not yet signed) 
23.4.1979 
11.12.1974 
12.6.1974 
18.7.1975 
2.7.1974 
14.5.1975 
19.11.1975 
15.7.1975 
11.10.1919 (draft) 
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8. Ireland 
.Poland 
USSR 
13.6.1977 for ten years 
16. 12. 1976 
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ANNEX III 
IMPORTS INTO EEC· MEMBER STATES FROM ·EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRI~S AND CHINA1 ' 2 
(1978-1979) 
(in million EUA) 
1978 1979 INDEX 
USSR 6,473 8,407 130 
GDR 642 718 112 
POLAND 2,256 2,442 108 
CY.l•:CIIO!; l.OV 1\ 'K 1/\ l,OC)J 1,2Hb lJII 
HUNGARY 1,012 1, 260 125 
ROMANIA 1,073 1,586 148 
UULGl\RIA 289 408 141 
ALBANIA 23 48 209 
~ 12,861 16,155 126 
% of EEC EXTERNAL TRADE 7. 2 7.4 
CHINA 937 1,324 141 
1 Excluding intra-German trade 
2 Source: OECD. Monthly bulletin 3/1979 and telephone communication 
Luxembourg 
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COMMUNITY IMPORTS FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CHINA 1979-1980 
(first 6 months) 
(in million EUA) 
1979 1980 INDEX 
USSR 3,327 4,730 142 
GDR 306 411 134 
POIAiiD 1,102 1,444 131 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 589 733 124 
HUNGARY 571 661 116 
ROMAl'fliA 652 817 125 
BULGARIA 178 194 109 
ALBANIA 22 26 108 
~ 6,747 9,016 134 
% of EEC EXTERNAL TRADE 6.7 6.6 
CHINA 568 869 153 
Sources: OECD. Monthly bulletin 3/1979 and telephone canmunication Luxembourg 
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ANNEX IV 
EXPORTS FROM EEC MEMBER STATES TO FASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRI'BS AND CHINA l, 2 
( 1978-1979) 
(in million EtlA) 
.. 
1978 1979 INDEX 
USSR 5,632 6,310 112 
GDR 536 745 139 
POlAND 2,509 2,479 99 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1,211 1,277 105 
HUNGARY 1,545 1,478 96 
ROMANIA 1,421 1,744 123 
BULGARIA 539 599 111 
ALBANIA 32 40 "125 
~ 13,425 14,672 109 
% of EEC EXTERNAL TRADE 7.7 7.6 
' CHINA 1,489 2,101 141 
1 Excluding intra-German trade 
2 Source: OECD. Monthly bulletin 3/1979 and telephone communication 
Luxembourg 
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COMMUNITY EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROP~N COUNTRIES AND CHINA 1979-1980 
(first 6 months} 
(1ft million ·EUA} 
1979 1980 INDEX 
USSR 3,049 3,753 123 
GDR 362 404 112 
POLAND 1,206 1;478 123 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 559 633 113 
HUNGARY 749 767 102 
ROMANIA 909 875 96 
BULGARIA 273 337 123 
ALBANIA 13 22 169 
~ 7,120 8,269 116 
% of EEC EXTERNAL TRADE 7.7 7.6 
CHINA 1,062 809 76 
Sources: OECD. Monthly bulletin 3/1979 and telephone communication Luxembourg 
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ANNEX V 
DEVELOPMENT ·OF EEC EXTERNAL TRAJ)B WITH TftB EASTERN EUROPEAN STATE-TRAJ)ING 
COUNTRIES 
Year 
19581 
1960 
1963 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
19772 
l97B 
1979 
--- -· 
(in million EUA) 
Total volume of EEC external trade with the 
COMECON countries 
Value Percentage growth 
1,910 
-
2, 771 + 45 
3,490 + 26 
3,814 + 38 
5,537 + 15 
6,010 + 9 
6,755 + 12 
7,590 + 12 
7,988 + 5 
9,409 + 18 
12,413 + 32 
17,991 + 45 
20,196 + 12 
23,854 + 18 
25,527 + 7 
26,286 + 2.9 
30,827 + 17.2 
1 source: Eurostat, monthly bulletin - external trade - special number 
1958-1976, pp. 12 and 13 
2 Source: OECD. Monthly bulletin on external trade 
1
•
2 Excluding intra-German trade 
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ANNEX VI (A) 
BAIANCE OF TRADE 
between the European Community and the Eastern European countries 
land China) (1976-1979) (by country) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
USSR! -358 -347 -541 -2,097 
GDR. 
- 26 -115 -106 27 
POI AND 860 15 253 37 
CZEGUUSLUVA KIA 249 164 ll!l - ') 
HUNGARY 204 333 533 218 
ROMANIA 3 185 349 158 
BULGARIA 318 280 250 191 
ALBANIA 3 10 9 -8 
EUROPE TOTAL 1,253 +925 +565 -1,483 
CHINA +552 +777 
- S3•- PE 78.5%.· /fin./Ann. VI 
USSR 
GDR 
POLAND 
Balance of trade between the Community and 
the Eastern European countries and China .if 
1979-1980 (first 6 months) 
in million BUA 
1979 1980 
- 278 
- 977 
+ 56 - 7 
+ 104 + 34 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
-
30 
- 100 
HUNGA.RY + 178 + 106 
' 
ROMANIA + 257 + 58 
BULGARIA + 95 ,. + 143 
ALBANIA 
-
9 
-
4 
~ + 373 - 747 
CHINA + 494 
-
60 
* 
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ANNEX VI (B) 
aAIAHCE OF TRADE BE'!WBBN THE NINE MEMBER S'mTES OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES AND THE EASTERN ·EUROPEAN S'mTE-TRADING COUNTRIES 
(in million EUA) 
TOTAL1 II TOTAL2 II 
H 
1975 1976 ~ 1977 1978 1979 II 
II 
IMPORTS 8,470 11,331 II 
II 
12,301 12,862 16,155 
EXPORTS 11,726 12,523 II 13,226 13,425 14,672 !! 
+3,256 +1,192 II + 926 + 563 -1,483 BALANCE II II 
ii 
GOODS TRADE II II 
II 
TO'l'AL 20,196 23,854 II 25,527 26,287 30,827 II 
II 
1 Source: EUROS~T, monthly bulletins - external trade - special number 
1958-1976, pp. 12 and 13 
2 Source: OECD - monthly bulletin, special number 1958-1978 
1
•
2 Including Albania and excluding intra-German trade 
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ANNEX VII 
LIST OF RECENT ANTI-DUMPING COMPlAINTS AGAINST EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTJUES 
A. ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURE 
Product Exporting Officially Imposition of 
country opened ri hts 
provi- defini-
sional tive 
Galvanised sheeting (hot Bulgaria c 19 
dipped) 24. 1. 78 
Poland c 19 L 19 
24. 1. 78 (1/2) 
24.1.78 
GDR c 19 L 50 L 131 
24. 1. 78 22.2.78 (2) 
19.5.78 
Czechoslovakia c 19 
24.1.78 
Heavy and medium plate Bulgaria c 19 L 19 L 108(6) 24.1. 78 24.1. 78 22.4.78 
Hungary c 19 
24.1. 78 -
Poland c 19 L 39 L 195 
24.1.78 (4/6) 20.7.78 
9.2.78 
GDR c 19 L 23 L 108(6) 
24. 1. 78 28. 1. 7E 22.4.78 
Romania c 19 L 23 L 108 
24.1.78 28.1. 7E (5/6) 
22.4.78 
czechoslovakia c 19 L 19 L 195 
24. 1. 78 (3/6) 20.7.78 
Closure after 
•arrangement' 
or similar 
solution 
c 110 
11.5.78 
c 184 
2.8.78 
Official Journal No. and 
date 
Closure in Closux-e after 
view of official re-
'other de- jeot-ion of 
velopments' complaint 
24. 1. 7E 
(1) Extens1on OJ No. L 108, 22.4.1978, p. 29, (2) Amendment OJ No. L 183, 5.7.1978, p. 1, (3) Extens1on OJ No. L 106, 
20.4.1978, p. 19r suspension OJ No. L 116, 28.4.1978, p. 20, (4) Extension OJ No.· L 120, 4.5.1978, p. 25: OJ No. 
T. u.c:;_ L6.1978. p. 45, (5) Suj~pension OJ No. L 155, 9.6.1978, p. 19, (6) Amendment OJ No. L 183, 5. 7.197t:i, p. l 
c.n 
-..I 
. 
~ 
:J 
:J 
• 
< H 
H 
Product Exporti.ng Officially Imposition of 
country opened ric;:hts 
provi- defini-
sional tive 
Thin sheet czechos :;_ ovakia c 19 L 19 24.1.78 (1/2) 
24.1. 78 
coils B'Ulgaria c 19 L 37 
L 120 
24.1.78 7.2.78 ( 2) 
4.5.78 
Hungary c 19 
24.1.78 
Poland c 19 
24.1.78 
czechoslovakia c 19 L 17 
24.1.78 (1/2) 
21 .. 1.78 
USSR c 19 
24.1.78 
Wire rods Hungary c 19 24. 1. 78 
Poland c 19 
24.1.78 
czechoslovakia c 19 L 19 
24.1.78 (1/2) 
24.1.7S 
Angles, shapes and Hungary c 33 
sections 9.2.78 
Czechoslovakia c 33 
9.2.78 
l<r"-=- liner USSR C lOS 
-- ... 3.5.78 
{1· Extens1on OJ No. L 106, 20.4.1978: suspens1on OJ No. L 116, 28.4.1978 
(2) Amendment OJ No. L 183, 5.7.1978 
Official Journal No. and date 
Closure after Closure in Closure after 
'arrangement' view of official re-
or similar 'other de- jection of 
solution velooments' canolaint 
c 184 
2.8.78 
c 184 
2.8.78 
c 184 
2.8.78 
c 184 
2.8.78 
c 184 
2.8.78 
c 110 
11. 5. 78 
c 174 . 
21.7.78 
U1 
CD 
~ 
-.J 
CD 
. 
U1 
10 
0\ 
<: 
H 
H 
Product 
Poly-buta-diene-styrene 
El~tric bulbs 
Sodium Carbonate 
Hardboard 
Herbicides 
Gas pipes 
Electric motors 
Exporting 
country 
GDR ) 
Poland ) 
R.OIIIania) 
Hungary ) 
Czechoslovakia ) 
Poland ) 
GDR ) 
Bulgaria ) 
GDR ) 
Poland ) 
Ranania ) 
USSR 
Czdchoslovakia ) 
Poland ) 
Ranania ) 
USSR ) 
Ranania 
Romania 
Bulgaria ) 
Czechoslovakia ) 
GDR ) 
Ranania ) 
Hungary ) 
Poland ) 
USSR 
Official Journal No. and date 
Officially Imposition of Closure after Closure in Closure after 
opened ric hts 'arrangement' view of official re-
provi- defini- or similar 'other de- jection of 
sional tive solution velopments' canplaint 
c 196 c 210 
17.8.7~ 10.8.79 
C2ll L 97 
5.9.78 15.4.80 
c 277 c 303 
21.11. 78 4.12.79 
C277 L 297 L 48 
21.11.78 24.11. 79 22.2.80 
c 286 L 145 
30.11. 78 11.6.80 
C311 
29.12.78 
c 21 c 109 
24.1.79 2.5.79 
c 103 L 5~ 
25.4.79 27.2.80 
c 103 L 53 L 153 
25.4.79 27.2.80 21. 6. 80 
Ul 
10 
I. 
<: 
H 
H 
Product 
Tyres 
Lithium hydroxide 
Angles, shapes and 
sections (iron/steel) 
saccharin 
Mechanical alarm clocks 
Ball bearings 
Mechanical watches 
Exp::;rting Officially 
c 0'..:r.1:ry opened 
-
GD~ ) c 107 
Romania ) 28.4.79 
Czechoslovakia) 
USSR c 126 
19.5.79 
Ranania c 146 
12.6.79 
China c 207 
17.8.79 
China ) c 212 
GDR ) 24.8.79 
Czechoslovakia) 
USSR ) 
Poland ) c 235 
Romania ) 18. 9. 79 
USSR ) 
USSR c 181 
19.7.80 
Official Journal No. and date 
Imposition of Closure after Closure in Closure after 
ric;rhts 'arrangement' view of official re-
provi- defini- or similar 'other de- jection of 
sional tive solution velopments' canplaint 
L 113 
1. 5. 80 
L 274 L 23 
31. 10. 79 30. 1. 80 
L 56 
29.2.80 
L 158 L 158 
25.6.80 25.6.80 
L 158 L 158 
25.6.80 25.6.80 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-750/80) 
t•b1ed by Mr Christopher JACKSON 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on detente and trade with Comecon countries 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX VIII 
- having regard to recent actions by the Soviet Union and other 
Comecon countries in relation to human rights and security, 
- recalling the work of the Conference on European Security and 
Cooperation in Madrid, 
- mindful of the current tensions in Eastern Europe, 
1. Requests the Commission, in consultation with ~mber States, to 
institute an immediate, thorough review of all trade and terms 
of trade between the Community and Comecon countries; 
2. Requests 'that a strategic analysis be made of auch trade and 
terms of trade to ascertain 
(a) whether products and know-how are being sold to Comecon 
countries, and in particular to Russia, which might 
directly or indirectly aid Russian military effort; 
(b) whether products and know•how are being sold which have a 
hi·;:. content of technology not readily av!lilable in 
Comecon countries and which therefore are of particular 
advantage to those countries; 
(c) whether products and know-how,are being sold to Comecon 
countries on terms which can bring damage to European 
industry or commerce through subsequent imports resulting 
from such sales or terms of sale 
(d) whether the Community is becoming reliant in any important 
respect on imports from Comecon countries; 
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3. Asks that the Commission, in consultation with Member States 
and coordinating action with the united States and Japan, should 
propose appropriate action and plans to reduce any European 
Community reliance on Comecon imports, and to reduce any strategic 
advantages currently given to Ruasia and other Comecon countries 
through Community trader adjusting this policy periodically 
according to the state of detenter 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministers 
acting in political cooperation and the Governments of the · 
United States and Japan. 
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